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The  lessons gleaned from the North America Free Trade  Agreement,  commonly known as NAFTA can
best be analyzed if the NAFTA  is viewed as  a process,  which began  roughly in  1990  and is  still only  in
the beginning stage of a long transition period.  This process can be divided into three phases:  negotiation,
legislation,  and  implementation.  Regarding  the  first and  third phases,  Mexico's  and  Canada's  lessons
learned  are likely similar to those in the United States.  The second  phase,  more  so than the other two,
reflects the unique U.S. political  system and was quite different in Canada and Mexico,  as  it would be in
other countries  in the Western Hemisphere.
At the beginning,  I note that my perspective is one of an economist who,  in an earlier capacity was charged
with attempting to analyze,  understand,  and forecast agricultural  production,  trade,  and policies,  suddenly
found herself thrust into the midst of a difficult  and contentious agricultural trade negotiation.  Since this
meeting  is  a gathering  of economists,  I will attempt to make my comments  and  observations  relevant to
economists  and what we do.
Negotiation  Phase
The negotiation phase can be further divided  into two categories  of problems:  substantive  and practical.
The main substantive issue can be summarized  as the process of reaching agreement  on the long-term goals
and objectives  of the negotiations,  and then working out a transition path to achieve the objectives  with
respect to specific commodity  concerns  and other trade sensitivities.  The  NAFTA agricultural  provisions
well illustrate the different objectives  of the NAFTA parties.
Substantive Issues
Going  back to  de negotiation of the U.S.  Canada  Free Trade Agreement  (CFTA) during  1986-87,  both
countries agreed to defer addressing the sensitive  issues concerning  nontariff barriers  (NTB's) pending the
completion of the Uruguay Round.  Thus,  the agreement  on agriculture was  limited  in scope and  effect.
When the NAFTA negotiations began, the Uruguay Round negotiations were languishing.  Canada insisted
that it still could not address NTB's in the NAFTA context,  whereas the United  States was willing to put
NTB's on the table for discussion. Thus,  the issue of the treatment of NTB's between the United States and
Canada was  still unresolvable  in  1992.  The United  States  and Canada maintauned their differences  with
respect to  the objectives  for the agricultural  provisions,  and the  CFTA was  simply rolled over  into the
NAFTA with no further liberalization specified.
Partly as a result of the limited agreement on agriculture,  the United  States and Canada continue to have
contentious,  unresolved agricultural trade issues.  Foremost is the question of the consistency  between the
tariffs created  in the Uruguay  Round to replace NTB's and the  obligations  stated in the NAFTA to not
impose new tariffs or raise existing ones. Secondly,  there has been a long running dispute over grain trade,
which reached crisis proportions in 1994 in the United States as a result of a large surge in U.  S.  imports
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and other border measures  come down,  the trade effects of incompatible  domestic policies become more
apparent and can have significant  economic  and political repercussions.  The  U.S.  Canadian agricultural
trade disputes illustrate  this finding all too well.
In contrast,  the United States and Mexico  were able to agree  on an ultimate goal of complete elimination
of tariff and nontariff  barriers  on agricultural  trade  at the  end  of a  transition  period.  Thus,  once  that
objective was agreed upon (about 6 months into the formal negotiations  in February  1992),  it took another
6 months to work out the transition arrangements  to address  the key  market access problems  and other
sensitive  issues.
Likewise, Canada  could  not agree  to a goal of complete liberalization  with Mexico,  and worked  out yet
another set of transition arrangements,  with some commodities  given
more liberal treatment than U.S.  commodities  and some exempt entirely from liberalization.
Although  some  NAFTA  provisions  are  trilateral-internal  support,  export  subsidies,  and  sanitary  and
phytosanitary measures  - because there was no trilateral  agreement on the ultimate objective  for market
access in agriculture,  the result was an odd, triangular structure of agricultural  provisions on market access.
The process  of adding  Chile to the NAFTA,  to which the NAFTA partners  agreed at the Miami Summit
last December, will have to wrestle with this question of ultimate objectives  and structure of the agreement
as well.
Practical Negotiating Problems
Substantive negotiating objectives are ultimately decided  by policymakers  at the highest levels.  Practical
negotiating  problems are handled by people like you and me.  The data and analysis  that support a trade
negotiation are quite different from what economists might do  in universities  and government agencies  to
test a trade theory or evaluate potential impacts of a particular trade agreement.  The stuff of negotiations
is extremely  detailed,  commodity specific,  and oriented to solving very  specific product sensitivities,  both
on the  import and export side.
Data  Requirements
For example,  going back to the CFTA, we had a major headache with trade data. Beginning in the  1980's,
it became  apparent that U.S.  trade data were  significantly  undercounting  U.S.  exports  to Canada.  One
positive  outcome  of the  a CFTA was  an agreement to use each other's import data to represent  exports.
This data difficulty  between two  large, wealthy countries  with a common border should make  all trade
economists pause to reflect as they load data in their computers to do sophisticated trade analysis!
The  practical  problems  were  compounded  when negotiations  with  Mexico  began.  A major  one  was
addressing differences in each country's tariff schedules  and trade data.  Simply trying to figure out what
each  country  was exporting  to  each  other,  by  tariff line,  consumed  enormous  amounts  of time.  For
example,  economists  may  simply  analyze  production  and  trade  of poultry  and  eggs  as  an aggregate
quantity, but trade negotiations require closely examining 20 to 30 different tariff lines for poultry and eggs
to evaluate what level of trade  is occurring at what rate of duty for which type of poultry.
48The reliability  and accuracy of data was a major problem in constructing  the tariff-rate  quotas  (TRQ's),
which  are the chief tool to achieve free trade over the transition period.  These  data problems  will likely
be compounded if the NAFTA enlarges to include  other  countries in Latin Ameriea,  where data and other
information may not be readily available  or well documented.
Another problem was gathering  the necessary data and information on Mexico's policies  and programs  in
order to understand those aspects  of Mexican agriculture that would be affected by a free trade agreement.
This was complicated by the fact that Mexico was in the midst of changing its  entire agricultural  policy,
and it was not clear what sort of policies  would emerge after the transition.  Again,  such uncertainty  is
likely  to  be  even more  prevalent  if the  NAFTA  is  extended  to  other  countries,  because  the  general
economic situation in many Latin American countries,  as well as post-Uruguay Round agricultural  policy,
is likely to continue  to undergo significant change.
Impact of the Uruguay Round
One Practical negotiating problem may have been solved by the Uruguay Round.  Future negotiations  on
market  access  will  begin  at  a  much  different  place  than  did  the  NAFTA,  which  was  the  first trade
agreement to use the tariffication concepts  and practice.  During the NAFTA,  once  Mexico and the United
States agreed on the objective of free trade,  a key aspect of the negotiation was  establishing  the various
tariff-rate  quotas and tariff equivalents to replace the NTB's. Much time was spent gathering  and evaluating
data,  such as domestic and international  prices,  consumption,  and
government  support payments. But now, at least in theory, for all GATT/WTO members there are no more
NTB's - only tariffs - which should greatly simplify future negotiations.  Simple tariffs are fast becoming
irrelevant as trade barriers,  and NTB's, having been converted to tariffs,  are now in a form to be phased
out as part of the next round of bilateral  or multilateral agreements.
Any  new  negotiations  will  begin where  the  Uruguay  Round  leaves  off.  The  Uruguay  Round  allows
countries  to establish  "ceiling bindings."  That is, previously unbound tariffs are  all now bound,  meaning
they cannot  be exceeded without providing  compensation to trading  partners.  But most Latin American
countries  have ceiling bindings that greatly exceed the tariffs that are actually  applied in daily commerce.
This situation existed in Mexico at the beginning  of the NAFTA negotiations,  but the negotiators  agreed
that the starting point would be the  duty applied  on bilateral trade.  One question for future negotiations  is
whether the phaseout of tariffs begins from bound or applied rates.
Just as the Uruguay Round may have helped solve one problem,  it may have  inadvertently  helped to create
another. Sanitary and phytosanitary  (SPS) measures  and technical barriers to trade,  such  as standards for
food  labeling,  grading,  or  pesticide  tolerances,  are  fast  becoming,  if they  are  not  already,  the  most
contentious  issue  in  international  trade  policy.  Both  the  NAFTA  and  the  WTO  have  ground-breaking
provisions  addressing the transparency  and use of SPS and standards.  But the implementation of these new
provisions  to address  a particular measure or practice  is relatively new,  and we are on the beginning  of the
learning  cube.  Just as  the  NAFTA  and WTO  have  hopefully  made  future  market  access  negotiations
simpler,  addressing technical  barriers  to trade  will become even  more important  and  subject  to closer
negotiating scrutiny.
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Another key area of the negotiations  was constructing the rules of origin-the rules that determine which
goods  are eligible for the NAFTA tariff preferences.  Many of these rules for agriculture  were carefully
developed to address economic - and political - sensitivities  with respect to Mexico and Canada.  How long
these rules can remain in place as the NAFTA enlarges  is  an open question.  They were designed  for the
North American market,  but may not be as  appropriate in a larger Western Hemisphere  context.  A free
trade area with many countries  becomes  increasingly difficult to hold together with complicated  rules of
origin.  A common market does  not have this difficulty,  but requires a different  political commitment  in
terms of integration  and harmonization of policies.  A common market  in the Western Hemisphere  is not
currently being contemplated,  but it may look more attractive from a purely technical and  administrative
sense  if the NAFTA enlarges much beyond its current members.
In  addition  to  SPS  and  standards,  other  areas  for negotiation  may  also  loom  larger  in  terms  of their
potential  effects  on agriculture  and trade  as traditional  market access  issues  become  less significant  in
affecting trade. For example,  intellectual property rights,  investment,  and transportation are  all key  areas
of interest for agricultural  trade. As with technical barriers to trade,  these areas will likely become  even
more important for agricultural  trade negotiators.
Legislative  Phase
This phase is unique to the United  States, because neither Canada nor Mexico  had to deal in the  same way
with a recalcitrant  and often unfriendly  legislature.  The domestic opposition  to NAFTA may have been
unparalleled in the annals of U.S. trade agreements.  After numerous supplemental agreements were  struck
to help ensure NAFTA's passage,  one lesson may have been quickly learned.  The passage of the  NAFTA
implementing  legislation  helped  pave  the  way  for  the  staffing  and  passage  of the  Uruguay  Round
legislation.  The  Uruguay  Round  implementing  legislation  was  much  less  encumbered  with  additional
provisions that were not,  in a strict sense, necessary  to implement the agreement.  Much more so than the
NAFTA,  the  Uruguay Round  legislation changed only those laws that  had to be changed  to make U.S.
legislation  consistent with the new agreement.
With respect to future trade negotiations, the key  issue for the United  States is securing  so-called fast track
legislation from the Congress.  Again, this type of legislation  is peculiar to the U.S. because of our political
system. Legislation  is not necessary  to negotiate  a trade agreement,  but the Congress  must authorize tariff
changes  through  legislation.  To  ensure  that  the  Congress  does  not  substantially  change  an  agreement
negotiated by the executive branch, the fast track approach was developed so that the Congress would pass
the necessary  legislation to implement a trade agreement expeditiously and  as negotiated.  Such legislation
is considered  necessary to pursue future free trade  agreements,  including  additions to the NAFTA.
Implementation Phase
We are at the year-and-a-half mark for the NAFTA.  Tariffs have begun to be cut,  and all NTB's between
the U.S.  and Mexico  are gone.  Total and agricultural  trade rose significantly  in the first year of NAFTA.
We  also  know  that  the  second  year,  which  started  off with Mexico's  peso  devaluation  and  resulting
economic  slump, will be significantly different prom the first year. For agricultural trade,  1995  will mean
more balanced bilateral trade with Mexico.
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between trade partners as they attempt to implement an agreement is long and rocky.  Implementation  issues
often occur at the intersection of the official text with domestic legislation and political  interests.  The  first
year  and  a  half of the  NAFTA has  been-full  of challenges.  These  challenges  have  been  of two kinds:
implementing what is actually in the agreement and addressing what is not in the agreement - the unfinished
business that did not get resolved during the negotation  phase. A good  example of the latter has been the
on-going  difficulties between  the United States and  Canada.
A  example  of the  first  kind  of  implementation  issue  has  been  the  administration  of  the  TRQ's.  The
proliferation  of TRQ's  as a mechanism for removing NTB's, both  in the NAFTA  and the World Trade
Organization (WTO),  has spawned  a whole set of implementation  questions;  for example,  who has the right
to import and under what terms and conditions.  Under the NAFTA, the  United States has opted for a first
come,  first-served  approach,  while Mexico  and  Canada  have chosen to  administer  closely the  right to
import under the TRQ's.  Dealing with the practical aspects of Mexico's  administration of the TRQ's, which
were  not  spelled  out in  the  agreement,  has  been a  significant problem  for  the  U.S.  Govermnent  and
exporters.
Another key area has  been the implementation  of the SPS provisions  - the first of its  kind  in any trade
agreement.  As both countries,  but  especially  Mexico,  have  made  changes  in  domestic procedures  and
practices,  the guidelines  and rules  in the NAFTA  for SPS,  as well as  standards,  have been called upon
often.  These measures, as well as the dispute settlement provisions,  will continue to be tested during the
implementation of the NAFTA.
With respect to unfinished  business,  one  very contentious  issue during  the negotiations  was  the use  of
export subsidies among the  NAFTA partners.  Both Mexico  and Canada wanted  to bar the use of export
subsidies on agricultural products  in the North American market.  The United States could not agree,  both
because Mexico could not commit to forego receiving subsidized imports from the European Union,  as well
as long-standing  U.S. concerns about the operation of the Canadian Wheat Board as a  state-trading entity
in the Mexican  and other markets.
Failure to completely  resolve the treatment of export subsidies  in the NAFTA negotiations  has left us with
on-going issues on Mexico's countervailing  duty  (CVD) investigation on U.S.  and Canadian wheat exports
and Mexico's potential CVD investigation  against U.S.  exports of vegetable  oils. Work on this issue will
continue in the NAFTA Working Group on Agricultural  Subsidies.  This issue will remain an important one
in the  context of Western Hemisphere  free trade as some  countries,  notably Argentina  and Canada  will
continue to press for a hemisphere free of export subsidies.  But other countries  in the hermisphere may face
an equally difficult choice of not importing  suidized product from outside the hemisphere.  U.S.  concerns
about export practices not currently  disciplined by the WTO  will continue.
What Countries Can Do To Prepare for Trade Negotiations
Based  on the NAFTA  experience,  coupled  with the years spent completing  the  Uruguay Round with its
very detailed negotiations  on agriculture, trade negotiators  should begin to have an understanding of the
basic elements  necessary to achieve  a successful  negotiating outcome.  Here,  I am not addressing the  "big
picture" questions of eligibility  requirements or preconditions for joining the NAFTA,  but rather some  of
the more practical aspects  of a trade negotiation.
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members  of the GATT/WTO.  But countries should be aware that there  are still numerous technical  and
practical requirements  of a NAFTA-type negotiation  that must be met to achieve  a successful negotiated
outcome.  Some of these have been mentioned as part of the practical negotiating  problems - for example,
having  reliable,  current,  detailed  tariff schedules  and trade  data (in an electronic,  user-friendly  form).
Another  very useful item would be good,  up-to-date,  detailed analytical reports  on country policies  and
programs.
Concerning the up and coming trade barriers of the 21st century  - SPS measures  and technical barriers  to
trade-it is necessary  to understand how a country's  regulatory process  works.  To this end,  it would be most
useful  to  have  organizational  charts  and  descriptions  of  which  agencies  in  the  government  have
responsibility  for developing  and  administering  SPS  measures  and  standards  for food  and  agricultural
products. For example, are regulations done through legislation or through an administrative process?  What
is  the relationship  between  federal  state,  and  local  laws?  The whole  issue  of the  transparency  in the
promulgation or modification of SPS measures or technical standards has been a significant implementation
issue, and will only become more  important.  Countries should be aware  of the increased  importance of
these technical  issues and be prepared to address  such questions.
The Role  of Economists
The  role  of economists  in  trade  negotiations  also  varies  with  the  different  phases  I  have  described.
Generally,  economists  don't like to think of themselves as  "hunters and gatherers"  of data or information.
Economists  often  want  to  test  hypotheses  with  complex  methods,  but  in  fact  during  the  NAFTA
negotiations  what was most needed and useful were good data and practical explanations  of the  effect of
country policies on patterns of production and trade.
At  different  times during  the  NAFTA  negotiations,  we  would  be  asked  to  assess  the  implications  of
different  liberalization  scenarios.  Another  question that  was  often  posed by  our  chief negotiators  was
whether  the  two  sides  had  achieved  a balance  in  concessions.  It was  next to  impossible  to  develop  a
framework that could encompass the phasing out of hundreds of tariff lines,  and the conversion of NTB's
to tariffs and their lengthy phaseouts,  not to mention the non-agricultural  portions of the NAFTA that could
have significant  impacts on trade.  As one more experienced trade negotiator explained  it to me,  "if you
can't tell which side has the best deal you know you've  got a good deal."  These more practical  aspects  of
evaluating  progress  and  potential  impacts  during  the  negotiation  phase  pose  a  tough  challenge  for
economists.
During the legislative phase,  it was  imperative to have credible,  valid,  and explainable  analysis to assess
the impact of the agreement  on the U.S.  agricultural  sector.  Having  good economic analysis  that explains
the benefits  of an agreement  may not win any votes  in the U.S.  Congress,  but not having such analysis
would  leave  an  Administration  naked  and  open  to  charges  that  it did  not  understand  what  its  own
negotiators  had done.
During the debate over the NAFTA in the legislative phase, tremendous attention was paid to potential job
loss as a result of the NAFTA.  The political  debate required that economists  (supporters) come up with
estimates  of specific trade benefits  and job creation.  What was perhaps more  important  for the United
States, but not subject to easy quantification,  were the benefits obtained from domestic policy reforms in
Mexico,  which were undertaken and locked in as a result of the disciplines imposed by the NAFTA. In the
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regime in Mexico, prompted and ensured by the NAFTA, may have been overlooked  in the  analysis.
Now that we are in the implementation  phase, it is likewise imperative to maintain on-going  analysis  of the
impacts of the NAFTA on the U.S.  economy. This is needed not only to address potential criticism of what
the  Administration has already negotiated,  but to help provide  proof of the benefits of trade agreements
to  the U.S.  economy  to justify future policy actions  such  as the creation  of the Free Trade Area  of the
Americas.
After NAFTA?
The Administration  is committed to pursuing further hemispheric trade liberalization  on two fronts:  through
the accession  of Chile to the  NAFTA  and through  a process  of consultation and negotiation  with other
regional trade  groups in the hemisphere to create the Free  Trade Area of the Americas by the year 2005.
Preliminary  discussions  with Chile  have  already  begun.  In  theory,  the process  of adding  Chile  to the
NAFTA should be easier than the negotiations that created the NAFTA,  because the goals and  objectives
are already contained within the NAFTA.  But agriculture is likely to be a difficult area in the negotiations,
precisely because  of the complicated structure  of the NAFTA agricultural provisions.  Perhaps  in a short
time,  we  will be engaged in another negotating process,  and we  will have  an opportunity  to see whether
in fact we have learned any lessons from the NAFTA.
53